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Abstract 
 
This paper provides some new empirical evidence on the weekend effect, one of the 
most recognized anomalies in financial markets. Two different methods are used: (i) 
a trading robot approach to examine whether or not there is such an anomaly giving 
rise to exploitable profit opportunities by replicating the actions of traders; (ii) a 
fractional integration technique for the estimation of the (fractional) integration 
parameter d. The results suggest that trading strategies aimed at exploiting the 
weekend effect can generate extra profits but only in a minority of cases in the gold 
and stock markets, whist they appear to be profitable in most cases in the FOREX. 
Further, the lowest orders of integration are generally found on Mondays, which can 
be seen as additional evidence for a weekend effect. 
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1. Introduction 
Detecting calendar effects (anomalies) in financial markets is of interest both to traders aiming to 
exploit them to gain extra profits and to researchers analysing whether there is evidence of market 
failure and of the inadequacy of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Several papers have tested 
for their presence using a variety of empirical methods. One of the most frequently studied 
anomalies is the weekend effect (Monday effect, day of the week effect) first discussed by French 
(1980), namely the tendency of financial assets to generate negative returns on Mondays. Different 
theories have been developed to account for its presence. In behavioural finance models it is 
attributed to the negative expectations of investors considering Monday the worst day of the week. 
Another possible explanation is that over the weekend market participants have more time to 
analyse price movements and as a result on Mondays a larger number of trades takes place. 
Alternatively, it might be due to deferred payments during the weekend, which create an extra 
incentive for the purchase of securities on Fridays leading to higher prices on that day. 
Overall, the empirical evidence is still mixed. The present study provides some new results 
based on two different methods: (i) a trading robot approach to examine whether or not there is such 
an anomaly giving rise to exploitable profit opportunities by replicating the actions of traders; (ii) a 
fractional integration  technique for the estimation of the (fractional) integration parameter d.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature 
on the weekend effect. Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
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Fields (1931) suggested that the best trading day of the week is Saturday. Another important study 
on the weekend effect is that by Cross (1973), who analysed the Friday-Monday data for the 
Standard & Poor's Composite Stock Index from January 1953 to December 1970 and found an 
increase on Fridays and a decrease on Mondays.French (1980) extended the analysis to 1977 and 
also reported negative returns on Mondays. Further contributions by Gibbons and Hess (1981), 
Keim and Stambaugh (1984), Rogalski (1984), and Smirlock and Starks (1986) also found the 
positive-Friday / negative-Monday pattern. Connolly (1999) also allowed for heteroscedasticity but 
still detected a Monday effect from the mid- 1970s.Rystrom and Benson (1989) explained the 
presence of the day-of-the-week effect on the basis of the psychology of investors who believe that 
Monday is a “difficult” day of the week and have a more positive perception of Friday. Ariel (1990) 
argued against a connection between the weekend and the Monday effect. Agrawal and Tandon 
(1994) examined 19 equity markets around the world, and found the day-of-the -week effect in most 
developed markets. Sias and Starks (1995) associate the weekend effect with stocks in large 
portfolios of institutional investors. Research conducted in Fortune (1998, 1999) shows that it has a 
tendency to disappear and is a phenomenon with two components: the first is the “weekend drift 
effect”, i.e. stock prices tend to decline over weekends but rise during the trading week; the second 
is the “weekend volatility effect”, i.e. the volatility of returns during weekends is less per day than 
that over contiguous trading days.  
As for the role of short-selling, Kazemi, Zhai, He and Cai (2013) and Chen and Singal 
(2003) explain the weekend effect as resulting from the closing of speculative positions on Fridays 
and the establishing of new short positions on Mondays by traders. However, the results of the 
study by Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2007) do not support this conclusion. Further evidence is 
provided by Singal and Tayal (2014) for the futures market, Olson, Chou, Mossman (2011) who 
carry out various breakpoint and stability tests, and Racicot (2011) who uses spectral analysis. The 
findings from other relevant studies are summarised in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Weekend effect: an overview of recent researches 
Author 
Type of 
analysis 
Object of analysis 
(time period, market, 
index) 
Results 
Sias, Starks 
(1995) 
Hypothesis 
testing (t-test 
and F-test) 
1977-1991 market 
equity capitalization, 
institutional holdings, 
daily returns and 
volume of 1500 
institutional investors 
on the NYSE 
The weekend effect is driven primarily 
by institutional investor trading patterns 
Fortune 
(1998) 
Jump 
diffusion model 
of stock returns 
January 1980 -June 
1998 - daily close-to-
close data for the 
S&P 
500  
The negative weekend drift appears to 
have disappeared although weekends 
continue to have low volatility 
Fortune 
(1999) 
January 1980 -
January 1999 
daily close-to-close 
data of  the Dow 30, 
the S&P 500, the 
Wilshire 5000, the 
Nasdaq Composite, 
and the Russell 2000 
The weekend drift effect is a ﬁnancial 
anomaly that will ultimately correct 
itself. 
Schwert 
(2003) 
Correlation 
analysis 
1885–1927 - the Dow 
Jones indexes 
portfolio;  1928–2002 
- the S&P composite 
portfolio  
The weekend effect seems to have 
disappeared  since the 1980-s  
Chen, Singal 
(2003) 
Descriptive and 
regression 
analysis 
July 1962 - 
December 1999 - 
New York Stock 
(NYSE); December 
1972 - December 
1999 - Nasdaq - daily 
returns for stocks; 
June 1988 - 
December 1999 
Nasdaq and January 
1988 – 1999 NYSE - 
monthly short interest 
data 
Speculative short sales can explain the 
weekend effect.  
 
Hsaio, Solt 
(2004) 
 
one-tailed 
nonparametric 
test based on 
the 
approximated 
normal 
distribution аnd 
parametric test 
to examine the 
January  1988 to 
December  2000 (678 
weeks) - the 3:00 and 
closing values for the 
S&P 500 index; 
April  1988 to 
December  2000 (669 
weeks) - the CREF 
stock, growth, and 
Presence of weekend effect in the 
average daily returns for many of the 
tested portfolios till 2000.  
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strategies’ 
market timing 
ability 
money market 
account; April  1994  
to December  2000 
(332 weeks) – growth  
account  
Christophe, 
Ferri, Angel  
(2007) 
Descriptive and 
regression 
analysis 
September  2000 - 
July  2001 daily 9:30 
am-4:00 pm data on 
NASDAQ-listed 
stock  
Speculative short-selling does not 
explain the Monday-Friday difference in 
returns  
Olson, Chou, 
Mossman, 
(2011) 
Regression 
analysis, Chow 
breakpoint 
tests, Bai-
Perron Tests  
1973 – 2007 - the 
Dow-Jones 30 
Industrials, Standard 
and Poor's 500,  
Standard & Poor’s 
Midcap  
400, Standard & 
Poor’s Smallcap 600, 
NASDAQ 100, 
American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) 
Composite indices 
The weekend effect may have already 
gone through its entire involving 
identification, exploitation, decline, 
reversal, and disappearance. There is no 
significant weekend effect in U.S. small 
stocks after about mid 2003 
Racicot 
(2011) 
Spectral 
analysis 
1970-1973 - S&P500 
index  
Spectral analysis confirms the Monday 
effect. 
Kazemi, Zhai, 
He and Cai 
(2013) 
Descriptive and 
regression 
analysis 
January 1980 – 
present time, 60 
market indices from 
59 countries (For all  
countries, except US, 
major stock index is 
used. For the US both 
the Dow Jones Index 
and the S&P 500 
were used) 
 
During the period from 1980 to 1994, 
short sales can explain the weekend 
effect. During the period from 1995 to 
2007, the cross-sectional weekend effect 
cannot be explained by short sales.  
Singal and 
Tayal (2014) 
 
Descriptive and 
regression 
analysis 
1990 – 2012, eight 
futures: Crude oil, 
Heating Oil, 
Soybeans, Sugar, 
S&P 500 Index, 
 British Pound,  
 10-Year Treasury 
Note, and Gold 
Evidence of the weekend effect in 
futures markets shows that security 
prices will generally be biased upwards, 
with greater overvaluation for more 
volatile securities. Unconstrained short 
selling is not a sufficient condition for 
unbiased prices 
 
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
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We use daily data for 35 US companies included in the Dow Jones index and 8 Blue-chip Russian 
companies. The sample period for the US and Russian stock markets covers the period from 
January 2005 and 2008 respectively till the end of April 2014. We also analyse the FOREX using 
data on the six most liquid currency pairs (EURUSD, GBPUSD, USDJPY, USDCHF, AUDUSD, 
USDCAD) and gold prices over the period from January 2000 and 2005 respectively till the end of 
April 2014. 
Our first (trading-bot) approach considers the weekend effect from the trader’s viewpoint, 
namely whether it is possible to make abnormal profits by exploiting it. Specifically, we programme 
a trading robot which simulates the actions of a trader according to an algorithm (trading strategy). 
To test it with historical data we use a MetaTrader trading platform which provides tools for 
replicating price dynamics and trades according to the adopted strategy.  
We examine two trading strategies: 
- Strategy 1: Sell on Friday close. Close position on Monday close.  
- Strategy 2:   Sell on Monday open. Close position on Monday close. 
If a strategy results in the number of profitable trades > 50% and/or total profits from trading are > 
0, then we conclude that there is a market anomaly. 
Our second approach is based on estimating the degree of integration of the series for 
different days of the week. Specifically, we use the Whittle function in the frequency domain, as in 
following model: 
,)1(; tt
d
tt uxLxty            (*) 
where yt is the observed time series; α and β are the intercept and the coefficient on the linear trend 
respectively, xt is assumed to be an I(d) process where d can be any real number, and ut is assumed 
to be weakly autocorrelated. However, instead of specifying a parametric ARMA model, we follow 
the non-parametric approach of Bloomfield (1973), which also produces autocorrelations decaying 
exponentially as in the AR case. If the estimated order of integration for a particular day, 
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specifically Monday, is significantly different from that for the other days of the week, then it can 
be argued that there is evidence of a weekend effect. 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
Detailed results are presented in the Appendix. Table 1 summarises those for Strategy 1.  
Table 1a: Summary of testing results for Strategy 1 
Type of a 
market 
Totaltrades Profittrades 
Profittrades 
% oftotal 
Totalnetprofit 
Profittrades 
%>50, % 
Profit>0, 
% 
US stock 
market 
434 201 46% -1334 14% 26% 
Russian 
stock 
market 
325 141 43% -285 0% 13% 
FOREX 724 357 49% 7726 50% 50% 
GOLD 453 210 46% -18733 0% 0% 
 
In general this strategy is unprofitable in the stock markets (both US and Russian) and in 
gold market but can generate profits in the FOREX. However, in the latter case, the  number of 
profitable trades is less than 50%, and only for 3 of the 6 currencies analysed can profits be made. 
Overall, the EMH is not contradicted. 
The corresponding results for Strategy 2 are presented in Table 1b. 
Table 1b: Summary of testing results for the Strategy 2 
Type of 
a market 
Totaltrades Profittrades 
Profittrades 
% oftotal 
Totalnetprofit 
Profittrades 
%>50% 
Profit>0, 
% 
US stock 
market 
405 190 47% -650 20% 34% 
Russian 
stock 
market 
329 149 45% 40 13% 25% 
FOREX 724 358 49% 2738 33% 67% 
GOLD 449 224 50% 15673 0% 100% 
 
It appears that this strategy can be profitable in 3 of the 4 markets examined, especially in 
the FOREX and gold markets. However, the number of profitable trades is less than 50% in the 
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stock market, specifically 34% and 25% using a single asset in the US (with only 12 out of 35 
instruments generating profits) and Russian stock markets. The corresponding percentage for the 
FOREX is 67%, indicating the existence of a market anomaly in this case. 
These results imply that Strategy 2 (Sell on Monday open. Close position on Monday close) 
is much more profitable than Strategy 1 (Sell on Friday close. Close position on Monday close). 
The implication is that the weekend effect cannot be attributed to the arrival of new information 
during weekends, and that the appropriate formulation for the weekend effect is “Mondays tend to 
generate negative returns”.  
Given this mixed evidence, we also estimate the differencing parameter d for each day of the 
week under the three standard parameterisations of no deterministic terms, an intercept, and an 
intercept with a linear time trend. In the majority of cases, the lowest estimated value of d is found 
to be on Mondays (see Table B in the Appendix).  The only two exceptions are the USDCHF and 
ALTRIA series, for which the lowest estimate corresponds to Friday and Wednesday respectively. 
However, this evidence is weak, since the unit root null hypothesis (d = 1) cannot be rejected in any 
case. The fact that the estimate of d is systematically smaller for Mondays than for the other days of 
the week suggests abnormal behaviour on this day. An estimated value of d significantly smaller 
than 1 would imply that it is possible to make systematic profits on this day of the week using 
historical data. However, as can be seen in the Appendix, the confidence intervals are relatively 
wide in all cases, and therefore the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any day of the 
week, which implies weak support for a weekend effect.  
 
5.  Conclusions  
This paper examines one of the most recognized anomalies, i.e. the weekend effect, in various 
financial markets (US and Russian stock markets, FOREX, gold) applying two different methods to 
daily data. The first, the trading-bot approach, uses a trading robot to simulate the behaviour of 
traders according to a given algorithm (in our case trading on the weekend effect) and considering 
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two alternative strategies. The second analyses the stochastic properties of the series on different 
days of the week by estimating their fractional integration parameter, testing if this value differs 
depending on the day of the week. 
The results can be summarised as follows. Strategy 1 (Sell on Friday close. Close position on 
Monday close) is unprofitable in most cases. The only possible “weekend effect” formulation is 
“negative returns on Mondays”. This is confirmed by the results for Strategy 2 (Sell on Monday 
open. Close position on Monday close): in this case it is possible to make profits, although the 
number of profitable deals is less than 50% and therefore it cannot be concluded that there is a 
market anomaly according to our criterion. The estimates of the fractional parameter d are lowest on 
Mondays in most cases, which is evidence in favour of the weekend effect, although the wide 
confidence intervals mean that this evidence is rather weak. Finally, exploitable profit opportunities 
based on the weekend effect are found mainly in the FOREX market. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1 
 
US stock market, Strategy 1 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades 
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Profit per 
deal 
Alcoa 442 206 47% -379 -0.9 
AltriaGroup 444 177 40% -2518 -5.7 
American Express Company 442 224 51% 747 1.7 
AmericanInternationalGroupInc 444 205 46% -1003 -2.3 
ATT Inc 441 184 42% -2253 -5.1 
BankofAmerica 409 201 49% 1881 4.6 
Boeing 444 212 48% -2324 -5.2 
CaterpillarInc 408 185 45% -5631 -13.8 
CISCO 409 187 46% -1478 -3.6 
Coca-Cola 445 184 41% 1009 2.3 
DuPont 445 215 48% -670 -1.5 
ExxonMobilCorporation 445 200 45% -3803 -8.5 
Freeport-McMoRan 
Copper&GoldInc 
409 207 51% 3711 
9.1 
Hewlett-Packard Company 412 194 47% 417 1.0 
HomeDepotCorp 445 223 50% -755 -1.7 
HoneywellInternationalInc 445 218 49% -685 -1.5 
IntelCorporation 444 190 43% -1778 -4.0 
InternationalPaperCompany 445 213 48% -832 -1.9 
Johnson&Johnson 445 201 45% -3261 -7.3 
JP MorganChase 445 220 49% 2016 4.5 
KraftFoods 410 166 40% -2781 -6.8 
McDonaldsCorporation 445 190 43% -5021 -11.3 
MerckCoInc 445 205 46% -3812 -8.6 
Microsoft 445 198 44% -1365 -3.1 
MMM Company 445 201 45% -2364 -5.3 
Pfizer 445 202 45% -1409 -3.2 
ProcterGambleCompany 445 198 44% -3563 -8.0 
QUALCOMM Inc 409 230 56% 2824 6.9 
Travelers 409 189 46% 27,8 0.1 
UnitedParcelServiceInc 409 175 43% -4776 -11.7 
United Technologies Corporation 445 209 47% -4521 -10.2 
VerizonCommunicationsInc 449 203 45% -1059 -2.4 
Wal-Mart StoresInc 445 200 45% -3445 -7.7 
WaltDisney 445 213 48% -824 -1.9 
Yahoo! Inc 406 215 53% 2977 7.3 
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Average 434 201 46% -1334 -3 
Table A2 
US stock market, Strategy 2 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades 
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Profit per 
deal 
Alcoa 412 204 50% 594 1.4 
AltriaGroup 413 184 45% -1389 -3.4 
American Express Company 412 218 53% 1194 2.9 
AmericanInternationalGroupInc 413 231 56% 1227 3.0 
ATT Inc 410 182 44% -1179 -2.9 
BankofAmerica 384 204 53% 2840 7.4 
Boeing 413 190 46% -851 -2.1 
CaterpillarInc 385 188 49% 78 0.2 
CISCO 384 173 45% -1091 -2.8 
Coca-Cola 413 175 42% -2691 -6.5 
DuPont 413 180 44% -594 -1.4 
ExxonMobilCorporation 413 180 44% -4024 -9.7 
Freeport-McMoRan 
Copper&GoldInc 
384 202 53% 7284 
19.0 
Hewlett-Packard Company 383 163 43% -2305 -6.0 
HomeDepotCorp 413 197 48% -679 -1.6 
HoneywellInternationalInc 413 200 48% -190 -0.5 
IntelCorporation 413 187 45% -1137 -2.8 
InternationalPaperCompany 413 206 50% 61 0.1 
Johnson&Johnson 413 180 44% -2377 -5.8 
JP MorganChase 413 197 48% 2259 5.5 
KraftFoods 382 174 46% -1374 -3.6 
McDonaldsCorporation 413 179 43% -3537 -8.6 
MerckCoInc 413 181 44% -2268 -5.5 
Microsoft 413 197 48% -1165 -2.8 
MMM Company 413 172 42% -1977 -4.8 
Pfizer 413 178 43% -1185 -2.9 
ProcterGambleCompany 413 173 42% -3806 -9.2 
QUALCOMM Inc 384 197 51% 1693 4.4 
Travelers 384 185 48% 320 0.8 
UnitedParcelServiceInc 384 161 42% -3972 -10.3 
United Technologies 
Corporation 
413 201 49% -2158 
-5.2 
VerizonCommunicationsInc 416 207 50% 140 0.3 
Wal-Mart StoresInc 413 189 46% -2782 -6.7 
WaltDisney 413 208 50% -5 0.0 
Yahoo! Inc 383 211 55% 2311 6.0 
Average 405 190 47% -650 -2 
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Table A3 
Russian stock market, Strategy 1 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades 
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Profit per 
deal 
GAZPROM 335 153 46% -81 -0.2 
NORILSKY NICKEL 373 174 47% -1540 -4.1 
LUKOIL 393 190 48% 1857 4.7 
ROSNEFT 218 98 45% -117 -0.5 
SBERBANK 365 158 43% -1262 -3.5 
GAZPROM NEFT 357 143 40% -228 -0.6 
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ 240 103 43% -540 -2.3 
VTB BANK 315 111 35% -369 -1.2 
Average 325 141 43% -285 -0.96 
 
Table A4 
Russian stock market, Strategy 2 
 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades 
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Profit per 
deal 
GAZPROM 325 135 42% -345 -1.1 
NORILSKY NICKEL 359 180 50% 1055 2.9 
LUKOIL 376 186 49% 1295 3.4 
ROSNEFT 210 89 42% -200 -1.0 
SBERBANK 352 171 49% -257 -0.7 
GAZPROM NEFT 345 141 41% -321 -0.9 
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ 359 168 47% -657 -1.8 
VTB BANK 306 120 39% -254 -0.8 
Average 329 149 45% 40 0.01 
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Table A5 
FOREX, Strategy 1 
Asset 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades 
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Profit per 
deal 
EURUSD 724 367 51% 25948 36 
GBPUSD 724 364 50% 48839 67 
USDCHF 724 334 46% -17523 -24 
USDJPY 724 370 51% 9807 14 
AUDUSD 724 358 49% -4671 -6 
USDCAD 724 349 48% -16044 -22 
Average 724 357 49% 7726 11 
 
TABLE A6 
FOREX, Strategy 2 
Asset 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades 
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Profit per 
deal 
EURUSD 724 363 50% 18640 26 
GBPUSD 724 360 50% 20576 28 
USDCHF 724 355 49% -16479 -23 
USDJPY 724 377 52% 6281 9 
AUDUSD 724 337 47% 554 1 
USDCAD 724 357 49% -13142 -18 
Average 724 358 49% 2738 4 
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TABLE A7 
Gold, Strategy 1 
Asset 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades 
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Profit per 
deal 
Gold 453 210 46% -18733 -41 
 
TABLE A8 
Gold, Strategy 2 
 
Asset 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades 
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Profit per 
deal 
Gold 449 224 50% 15673 35 
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Estimates of d in a model with autocorrelated errors 
Table B1:  Estimates of d in a model with autocorrelated errors: GOLD 
Day of the week No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Monday 0.930   (0.855,  1.064) 0.939   (0.866,  1.032) 0.939   (0.865,  1.035) 
Tuesday 0.930   (0.854,  1.047) 0.942   (0.871,  1.044) 0.942   (0.877,  1.042) 
Wednesday 0.938   (0.841, 1.064) 0.949   (0.872,  1.062) 0.950   (0.876,  1.068) 
Thursday 0.937   (0.843, 1.055) 0.946   (0.866,  1.053) 0.946   (0.864,  1.057) 
Friday 0.936   (0.840, 1.060) 0.943   (0.865,  1.054) 0.943   (0.863,  1.057) 
 
 
Table B2:  Estimates of d in a model with autocorrelated errors: EURUSD 
Day of the week No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Monday 0.954   (0.877,  1.044) 0.963   (0.885,  1.066) 0.963   (0.885,  1.063) 
Tuesday 0.958   (0.884,  1.037) 0.991   (0.900,  1.092) 0.992   (0.902,  1.092) 
Wednesday 0.961   (0.886, 1.055) 1.010   (0.921,  1.107) 1.010   (0.924,  1.107) 
Thursday 0.964   (0.876, 1.045) 1.008   (0.936,  1.106) 1.008   (0.935,  1.106) 
Friday 0.972   (0.890, 1.050) 1.003   (0.914,  1.104) 1.003   (0.914,  1.098) 
 
 
Table B3:  Estimates of d in a model with autocorrelated errors: USDCHF  
Day of the week No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Monday 1.008   (0.940,  1.104) 0.936   (0.856,  1.042) 0.936   (0.856,  1.045) 
Tuesday 1.016   (0.945,  1.117) 0.937   (0.857,  1.044) 0.936   (0.857,  1.042) 
Wednesday 1.012   (0.941, 1.113) 0.929   (0.853,  1.030) 0.929   (0.842,  1.032) 
Thursday 1.015   (0.931, 1.098) 0.930   (0.843,  1.013) 0.930   (0.846,  1.012) 
Friday 1.002   (0.920, 1.089) 0.928   (0.850,  1.034) 0.928   (0.843,  1.034) 
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Table B4:  Estimates of d in a model with autocorrelated errors: LUKOIL  
Day of the week No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Monday 0.987   (0.888,  1.118) 0.858   (0.736,  1.035) 0.858   (0.734,  1.035) 
Tuesday 0.989   (0.882,  1.155) 0.859   (0.739,  0.978) 0.859   (0.739,  0.977) 
Wednesday 0.934   (0.837, 1.059) 0.868   (0.752,  1.024) 0.868   (0.752,  1.019) 
Thursday 1.007   (0.883, 1.143) 0.927   (0.793,  1.073) 0.921   (0.802,  1.075) 
Friday 1.002   (0.905, 1.136) 0.898   (0.767,  1.057) 0.898   (0.776,  1.055) 
 
 
Table B5:  Estimates of d in a model with autocorrelated errors: GAZPROM  
Day of the week No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Monday 0.939   (0.820,  1.184) 0.963   (0.836,  1.102) 0.963   (0.836,  1.102) 
Tuesday 0.962   (0.845,  1.107) 0.992   (0.857,  1.144) 0.992   (0.855,  1.142) 
Wednesday 0.954   (0.841, 1.100) 0.982   (0.863,  1.130) 0.982   (0.863,  1.132) 
Thursday 0.962   (0.831, 1.118) 0.997   (0.863,  1.155) 0.997   (0.862,  1.155) 
Friday 0.939   (0.877, 1.089) 0.987   (0.860,  1.131) 0.988   (0.861,  1.132) 
 
 
Table B6:  Estimates of d in a model with autocorrelated errors: ALTRIA  
Day of the week No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Monday 1.005   (0.910,  1.122) 1.008   (0.916,  1.132) 1.007   (0.915,  1.133) 
Tuesday 0.993   (0.925,  1.097) 0.992   (0.907,  1.094) 0.992   (0.907,  1.096) 
Wednesday 0.986   (0.911, 1.090) 0.971   (0.883,  1.076) 0.971   (0.883,  1.076) 
Thursday 0.986   (0.913, 1.103) 0.979   (0.903,  1.085) 0.979   (0.903,  1.086) 
Friday 1.001   (0.917, 1.093) 0.991   (0.900,  1.091) 0.994   (0.900,  1.091) 
 
  
Table B7:  Estimates of d in a model with autocorrelated errors: FREEPORT 
Day of the week No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Monday 1.042   (0.944,  1.183) 1.047   (0.944,  1.183) 1.047   (0.943,  1.190) 
Tuesday 1.096   (0.984,  1.232) 1.050   (0.990,  1.255) 1.064   (0.990,  1.255) 
Wednesday 1.074   (0.960, 1.210) 1.073   (0.962, 1.204) 1.072   (0.960, 1.204) 
Thursday 1.044   (0.943, 1.199) 1.044   (0.943, 1.179) 1.049   (0.943, 1.179) 
Friday 1.067   (0.967, 1.221) 1.088   (0.962, 1.224) 1.088   (0.962, 1.225) 
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